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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal we must determine whether the so-called 
"antimodification provision" in 11 U.S.C.S1322(b)(2) applies 
to a second, wholly unsecured mortgage on a Chapter 13 
debtor's home. In Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 
U.S. 324, 113 S.Ct. 2106 (1993), the Supreme Court held 
that a Chapter 13 debtor who had a single mortgage with 
an outstanding balance greater than the value of the 
debtor's residence could not divide the mortgage, pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. S 506(a), into secured and unsecured parts 
and treat only the secured part as subject to the 
antimodification clause. According to Nobelman, the full 
outstanding balance of the mortgage is governed by the 
antimodification clause. Justice Thomas's opinion for the 
Court left unresolved, however, whether the 
antimodification clause applies to a second or junior 
mortgage if that mortgage is wholly unsecured by any 
remaining value in the residence.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Note that the phrase "wholly unsecured" in this context carries a 
specific meaning. While the mortgage holder of course initially obtained 
a security interest in the debtor's residence and in that sense has a 
secured claim, the second mortgage is now deemed wholly unsecured in 
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In interpreting Nobelman the Bankruptcy and District 
Courts both concluded that the second mortgage on the 
McDonalds' residence is subject to the antimodification 
clause, even if the value of their home is less than the 
outstanding balance of the first mortgage, leaving the 
second mortgage wholly unsecured. Because we conclude 
that this interpretation fails to take into account several 
strands of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Nobelman, we 
will reverse. 
 
I 
 
Before reaching when the antimodification clause applies, 
we must address a question about our jurisdiction. In the 
Bankruptcy Court the parties purportedly entered into a 
stipulation of facts specifying that the outstanding balance 
of the first mortgage is greater than the value of the 
McDonalds' home. At oral argument before this court, 
however, Master Financial, the appellee and holder of the 
second mortgage on the McDonalds' home, asserted that 
their "stipulation" is not binding. On Master Financial's 
view if the Bankruptcy Court had held that the 
antimodification provision does not apply to wholly 
unsecured mortgages, then Master Financial would have 
contested whether the value of the home was indeed less 
than the outstanding balance of the first mortgage. Master 
Financial's interpretation of the "stipulation" apparently 
captured the Bankruptcy Court's understanding of the 
case, for that Court's opinion simply noted that Master 
Financial disputed the value of the home and stated that no 
evidentiary hearing had been held on the issue. Thus, as 
matters stand, we can only say that the McDonalds have 
alleged that the value of their home is $126,400, the 
balance of the first mortgage is $127,633.33, and the 
balance of the second is $46,846.42. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the sense that the value of the debtor's residence is less than the 
amount due to a first or senior mortgage holder, leaving no remaining 
value for the second mortgage. Thus, at a foreclosure sale the holder of 
the wholly unsecured second mortgage would receive nothing from the 
direct proceeds of the sale. 
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In light of Master Financial's disavowal of any binding 
stipulation, we raised the issue of whether the bankruptcy 
court's decision amounted to an advisory opinion and 
consequently whether we have jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal. Federal courts are not authorized to issue advisory 
opinions. See, e.g., United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent 
Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446, 113 S.Ct. 
2173, 2178 (1993); Coffin v. Malvern Federal Savings Bank, 
90 F.3d 851 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
The precise analytical contours of what constitutes an 
advisory opinion, however, are less than clear. For example, 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) allows a court to resolve certain legal 
disputes in advance of factual disputes. Even though 
allowing discovery and conducting a hearing on the facts 
could have provided an alternative, and perhaps in some 
sense narrower, ground for resolving the suit, a court can 
still consider a legal issue that, if decided in the defendant's 
favor, would be dispositive on a motion to dismiss. Doing so 
conserves both the court's and the parties' resources. In 
keeping with this logic we appreciate that in the context of 
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy involving comparatively small 
sums of money, the parties understandably wanted to avoid 
expenses, such as the cost of expert testimony, that would 
have been incurred contesting the value of the home if in 
the end the evidence produced would be legally irrelevant. 
 
While the record is not entirely clear, we conclude that 
this case was decided on a motion to dismiss, 
notwithstanding the parties' odd references to a nonbinding 
stipulation of facts. The Bankruptcy Court's opinion 
accepted as true the McDonalds' allegations that the 
second mortgage was wholly unsecured and still held as a 
matter of law that the debtors must lose their adversary 
proceeding. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the 
Bankruptcy Court's interpretation of Nobelman  conclusively 
resolved the litigation and did so without improperly 
issuing an advisory opinion. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that we are authorized to hear 
this appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 158(d), and since we are presented with a purely legal 
issue, we exercise plenary review over the District Court's 
determination, a determination that in turn resulted from a 
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plenary review of the Bankruptcy Court's conclusions of 
law. See, e.g., In re Anes, 195 F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
II 
 
Our analysis of the merits of this appeal begins with two 
provisions of the bankruptcy code. The first, 11 U.S.C. 
S 506(a), applies to bankruptcies under all chapters, see 11 
U.S.C. S 103(a), and sorts creditors' allowed claims against 
the debtor into secured and unsecured claims. Under 
S 506(a) any allowed claim that is secured by a lien on the 
debtor's property "is a secured claim to the extent of the 
value of [the] creditor's interest in the estate's interest in 
such property," and is deemed an unsecured claim to the 
extent it exceeds that value. An undersecured claim is thus 
treated as a secured claim only up to the value of the 
collateral; the excess debt becomes an unsecured claim. 
 
The second relevant provision, the antimodification 
clause, applies only to Chapter 13 bankruptcies. The 
antimodification clause states that a Chapter 13 plan may 
"modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than 
a claim secured only by a security interest in real property 
that is the debtor's principal residence. . . ." 11 U.S.C. 
S 1322(b)(2). Put more directly, the antimodification clause 
bars a debtor from modifying the rights of a creditor who 
has a claim secured only by the debtor's principal 
residence. 
 
Before Nobelman some courts had concluded that in a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy they should look first toS 506(a) to 
determine both the value of a debtor's residence and how 
much of the mortgage remained secured. The courts would 
then treat only the portion deemed secured underS 506(a) 
as subject to the antimodification provision inS 1322(b)(2). 
See, e.g., In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992); In re 
Hart, 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. 
Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 
1990); and In re Hougland, 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989). 
Other courts, by contrast, concluded that there was a 
conflict between S 506(a) and S 1322(b)(2) and decided that 
S 1322(b)(2) should prevail as the more specific provision. 
See, e.g., In re Nobleman, 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992). 
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In reviewing the Fifth Circuit opinion, the Supreme Court 
agreed that S 1322(b)(2) applies to both the part of a 
mortgage that is currently secured by value in the 
residence and the part that is unsecured, but significantly 
the Court nevertheless rejected the Fifth Circuit's position 
that S 506(a) does not apply. Justice Thomas began his 
analysis by pointing out that it is "correct to look to S 506(a) 
for a judicial valuation of the collateral to determine the 
status of the bank's secured claim," and doing so in 
Nobelman, he continued, showed that the mortgage holder, 
American Savings Bank, was "still the `holder' of a `secured 
claim,' because petitioner's home retains $23,500 of value 
as collateral." 508 U.S. at 329, 113 S.Ct. at 2110. 
 
Once it was clear that American Savings was a holder of 
a claim secured by the debtor's principal residence, Justice 
Thomas reasoned that S 1322(b)(2) dictates that none of the 
bank's "rights" could be "modified" for its claim, even 
though part of the bank's claim was deemed unsecured 
under S 506(a). Finding that the term "rights" was not 
defined by the Bankruptcy Code, Justice Thomas invoked 
state law to determine the word's meaning and therefore 
concluded that, when the antimodification clause applies, it 
prevents the debtor's Chapter 13 plan from modifying the 
mortgage holder's state-law rights to repayment. What 
counts as impermissibly "modifying" a creditor's rights, 
however, should not be understood too broadly. Justice 
Thomas hastened to add that the mortgage holder's rights 
are still "affected" by the bankruptcy. The automatic stay, 
for example, still blocks the creditor's right to foreclose, and 
debtors can cure prepetition defaults on a home mortgage 
under S 1322(b)(5). See Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 330, 113 
S.Ct. at 2110. 
 
The McDonalds argue that because Nobelman stated that 
S 506(a) still applies and determines the"status" of a 
creditor's claim, it follows that a wholly unsecured 
mortgage is no longer a secured claim under the 
Bankruptcy Code and hence is not subject to the 
antimodification clause. Nobelman specifically said that the 
bank was a holder of a secured claim "because the 
petitioner's home retains $23,500 of value as collateral." 
508 U.S. at 329, 113 S.Ct. at 2110. In the McDonalds' case 
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they allege that there is no value left in their home as 
collateral for Master Financial's mortgage. 
 
So far the only appellate panel to apply Nobelman to a 
wholly unsecured mortgage has agreed with the McDonalds 
that such a mortgage is not subject to the antimodification 
clause. In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (9th Cir. BAP), appeal 
dismissed, 192 F.3d 1309 (9th Cir. 1999). The many 
bankruptcy courts to consider the issue have split, with a 
majority favoring the McDonalds' view2  but some adopting 
the opposing view.3 Bankruptcy treatises are also divided 
on the issue. Compare 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, 
S 1322.06[1][a]at 1322-16 ("If the creditor had held a lien 
on property that had no value (perhaps because the 
property was fully encumbered by prior liens), then under 
this analysis it would not have been a "holder of a secured 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See, e.g., In re McCarron, 242 B.R. 479 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 2000); In re 
Johnson, 226 B.R. 364 (D.Md. 1998); In re Cerminaro, 220 B.R. 518 
(Bankr.N.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Phillips, 224 B.R. 871 (Bankr.W.D.Mich. 
1998); In re Reeves, 221 B.R.756 (Bankr.C.D.Ill. 1998); In re Smith, 215 
B.R. 716 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn. 1998); In re Bivvins , 216 B.R. 622 
(Bankr.E.D.Tenn. 1997); In re Scheuer, 213 B.R. 415 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y. 
1997); In re Cervelli, 213 B.R. 900 (Bankr.D.N.J. 1997); In re Geyer, 203 
B.R. 726 (Bankr.S.D.Cal. 1996); In re Sanders , 202 B.R. 986 
(Bankr.D.Neb. 1996); In re Purdue, 187 B.R. 188 (S.D.Ohio 1995); Wright 
v. Commercial Credit Corp., 178 B.R. 703 (E.D.Va. 1995); In re Thomas, 
177 B.R. 750 (Bankr.S.D.Ga. 1995); In re Lee, 177 B.R. 715 
(Bankr.N.D.Ala. 1995); In re Woodhouse, 172 B.R. 1 (Bankr.D.R.I. 1994); 
In re Sette, 164 B.R. 453 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Castellanos, 178 
B.R. 393 (Bankr.M.D.Pa. 1994); In re Mitchell , 177 B.R. 900 
(Bankr.E.D.Mo. 1994); In re Hornes, 160 B.R. 709 (Bankr.D.Conn. 1993); 
In re Plouffe, 157 B.R. 198 (Bankr.D.Conn. 1993); In re Lee, 161 B.R. 
271 (Bankr.W.D.Okla. 1993); In re Moncrief, 163 B.R. 492 
(Bankr.E.D.Ky. 1993); In re Kidd, 161 B.R. 769 (Bankr.E.D.N.C. 1993); 
In re Williams, 161 B.R. 27 (Bankr. E.D.Ky. 1993). 
 
3. See, e.g., In re Boehmer, 240 B.R. 837 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1999); In re 
Tanner, 223 B.R. 379 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1998); In re Lewandowski, 219 
B.R. 99 (Bankr.W.D.Pa. 1998); In re Bauler, 215 B.R. 628 (Bankr.D.N.M. 
1997); In re Mattson, 210 B.R. 157 (Bankr.D.Minn. 1997); In re 
Shandrew, 210 B.R. 829 (Bankr.E.D.Cal. 1997); In re Fraize, 208 B.R. 
311 (Bankr.D.N.H. 1997); In re Barnes, 207 B.R. 588 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 
1997); In re Neverla, 194 B.R. 547 (Bankr.W.N.Y. 1996); In re Barnes, 
199 B.R. 256 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Jones , 201 B.R. 371 
(Bankr.D.N.J. 1996); In re Witt, 199 B.R. 890 (W.D.Va. 1996). 
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claim" entitled to protection by section 1322(b)(2).") with 
Keith M. Lundin, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 2d ed., S 4.46 at 
4-56 ("Although the concept of an "unsecured secured 
claim" is impossible under S 506(a), Justice Thomas's focus 
on the "rights" of the "holders" of a"claim secured only by 
. . ." in S 1322(b)(2) extends the protection from 
modification . . . without regard to the allowance or 
disallowance of secured claims under S 506(a)."). 
 
While we acknowledge that there is some ambiguity in 
the language in Nobelman, we believe that the better 
interpretation is that reached by Collier's, the Ninth Circuit 
bankruptcy panel in Lam, and the majority of bankruptcy 
courts to consider the issue. The Supreme Court did not 
adopt the Fifth Circuit's view that S 506(a) is inapplicable, 
and S 103(a) provides that S 506(a) does apply to a Chapter 
13 bankruptcy. Once we accept that courts must apply 
S 506(a), then it follows, even under Nobelman, that a 
wholly unsecured mortgage holder does not have a secured 
claim. Justice Thomas specifically said that the bank in 
Nobelman had a secured claim "because" the bank's lien 
still attached to some existing value in the debtor's house. 
We do not think there is any meaningful sense in which a 
court could be said to apply S 506(a) if the sole function of 
the section was simply to adopt the state-law label of the 
claim as secured. Moreover, if the value of the collateral 
were irrelevant, then it is hard to see why Justice Thomas 
would instruct that the debtors "were correct in looking to 
S 506(a) for a judicial valuation of the collateral to 
determine the status of the bank's secured claim." 
Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 328, 113 S.Ct. at 2110. Courts 
hardly need to perform a valuation of the collateral to adopt 
the original state-law label of the claim as secured. 
 
The only reason there is any doubt about the result is 
Justice Thomas's discussion of the term "claim" occurring 
in the antimodification clause. When he rejected the 
approach of the courts holding that the antimodification 
clause applies only to the still secured part of a mortgage 
under S 506(a), Justice Thomas said that those courts had 
incorrectly relied on the rule of the last antecedent. To see 
how that rule applies, recall that S 1322(b)(2) states that a 
debtor's Chapter 13 plan can "modify the rights of holders 
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 of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a 
security interest in . . . the debtor's principal residence. 
. . ." Under the rule of the last antecedent, the clause "other 
than a claim secured only by a security interest in . . . the 
debtor's principal residence," modifies its immediate 
antecedent, "secured claims." With "secured claims" as the 
term modified, courts had reasoned before Nobelman that 
the antimodification clause must apply only to the part of 
a mortgage that remained a "secured claim." Justice 
Thomas agreed that this reading "is quite sensible as a 
matter of grammar," but concluded that the reading "is not 
compelled." Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 330, 113 S.Ct. at 2111. 
 
He explained that the statute deliberately used the 
unmodified term "claim" in the antimodification clause, 
rather than the term "secured claim." Since"claim" receives 
a broad interpretation under the Bankruptcy Code, the 
term encompasses both the secured and unsecured 
portions of the mortgage, a conclusion showing that the 
antimodification clause applies to both parts of the 
mortgage. 
 
This discussion of the term "claim" has created some 
confusion because earlier Justice Thomas emphasized that 
applying S 506(a) in the case before the Court showed that, 
since value remained in the collateral, the bank was"still 
the `holder' of a `secured claim.' " Id. at 329, 113 S.Ct. at 
2110. If his subsequent discussion concluded that the 
antimodification clause, by using the unmodified term 
"claim," applied to both the unsecured and secured part of 
the mortgage, then why did he bother to establish earlier 
that the bank was still a holder of a secured claim? Doesn't 
the expansive reading of the term "claim" make it irrelevant 
whether the bank remains a holder of a secured claim? 
 
We think the Supreme Court's discussion of #8E8E # 506(a) 
and 1322(b)(2) is consistent. Perhaps the clearest 
explanation of how the Court's discussion of the two 
sections can be reconciled is to point out that while the 
antimodification clause uses the term "claim" rather than 
"secured claim" and therefore applies to both the secured 
and unsecured part of a mortgage, the antimodification 
clause still states that the claim must be "secured only by 
a security interest in . . . the debtor's principal residence." 
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11 U.S.C. S 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added). If a mortgage 
holder's claim is wholly unsecured, then after the valuation 
that Justice Thomas said that debtors could seek under 
S 506(a), the bank is not in any respect a holder of a claim 
secured by the debtor's residence. The bank simply has an 
unsecured claim and the antimodification clause does not 
apply. On the other hand, if any part of the bank's claim is 
secured, then, under Justice Thomas's interpretation of the 
term "claim," the entire claim, both secured and unsecured 
parts, cannot be modified. We think this reading reconciles 
the various parts of the Court's opinion.4 
 
Master Financial insists that the Supreme Court's 
statement that S 506(a) still applies is dictum and should 
be ignored. We disagree. Chief Judge Posner has aptly 
defined dictum as "a statement in a judicial opinion that 
could have been deleted without seriously impairing the 
analytical foundations of the holding--that, being 
peripheral, may not have received the full and careful 
consideration of the court that uttered it." Sarnoff v. 
American Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 
1986). Justice Thomas's statement that it is correct to 
apply S 506(a) is critical to Nobelman's holding, for if the 
petitioner's home had not retained some value as collateral, 
the Supreme Court's discussion of S 506(a) implies that the 
result would have been different. The Supreme Court's 
discussion is only dictum, in other words, if you assume 
Master Financial's reading of the case is correct at the 
outset. 
 
The bare fact that the Supreme Court was not 
considering a wholly unsecured mortgage does not convert 
into dicta every piece of reasoning in Nobelman  bearing on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Master Financial asserts in its brief that wholly unsecured mortgages 
are regularly bought and sold, and therefore a wholly unsecured 
mortgage has value and is still subject to the antimodification clause. 
Whatever value a wholly unsecured mortgage might have in the market 
Master Financial has in mind, that value has no bearing on the inquiry 
under S 506(a). Section 506(a) compares the value of the collateral 
against the "creditor's interest in the estate's interest in [the 
collateral]." 
Master Financial's position would only make sense if the creditor was 
entitled to collect from the debtor not only the money owed on the debt 
but also the price that the mortgage might be sold to someone else. 
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that issue. A holding, as Sarnoff's definition makes clear, 
extends beyond a statement of who won or lost a case. A 
court can choose among different holdings that offer 
broader or narrower ways of resolving a dispute. It is also 
worth emphasizing that the Supreme Court's discussion of 
S 506(a) was not likely to have been an ill-considered 
remark since the Fifth Circuit opinion that the Supreme 
Court reviewed expressly rejected that S 506(a) applies. See 
In re Nobelman, 968 F.2d 489, 488 (5th Cir. 1992). 
Furthermore, on Master Financial's interpretation the 
Supreme Court's discussion of S 506(a) is not dictum in the 
sense that it resolved a real legal issue, but one that could 
be readily deleted from the court's rationale for deciding the 
case; rather, Master Financial's view makes the Court's 
discussion of S 506(a) a useless aside that could not be 
relevant to any case involving the antimodification clause. 
 
But even if the discussion of S 506(a) could be accurately 
characterized as dictum--and we think it cannot be--we 
should not idly ignore considered statements the Supreme 
Court makes in dicta. The Supreme Court uses dicta to 
help control and influence the many issues it cannot decide 
because of its limited docket. "Appellate courts that dismiss 
these expressions [in dicta] and strike off on their own 
increase the disparity among tribunals (for other judges are 
likely to follow the Supreme Court's marching orders) and 
frustrate the evenhanded administration of justice by giving 
litigants an outcome other than the one the Supreme Court 
would be likely to reach were the case heard there." United 
States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 
We think the textual arguments about Nobelman  by 
themselves require the result we reach today, but we also 
are unpersuaded by Master Financial's policy arguments 
that the Supreme Court reached the wrong result. Thefirst 
point to stress is that, as Justice Stevens noted in his 
concurrence, the antimodification clause's legislative 
history shows that the provision's "favorable treatment of 
residential mortgagees was intended to encourage theflow 
of capital into the home lending market." 508 U.S. at 332, 
113 S.Ct. 2112. Because second mortgages are rarely used 
to purchase a home, making wholly unsecured second 
mortgages subject to the antimodification clause would 
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have at best a minimal impact in encouraging home 
building and buying. The holder of a second mortgage is 
apt to be very much like other general creditors, and 
therefore it seems reasonable that a wholly unsecured 
second mortgage will be subject to the same rules that 
apply to other secured claims--i.e., a claim not secured by 
any current value in the specified collateral is deemed an 
unsecured claim. 
 
One often-cited concern that Master Financial invokes is 
that it would be unjust and arbitrary to allow a mortgage 
holder to have an unmodifiable claim when there is merely 
one dollar of value left in the residence, but leave a 
mortgage holder with a modifiable (and hence potentially 
valueless) claim if there is no remaining value in the 
residence. We will begin with the complaint that the result 
is arbitrary and then turn to the objection that it is unjust. 
 
Bright-line rules that use a seemingly arbitrary cut-off 
point are common in the law. A day beyond the statute of 
limitations and the plaintiff must lose, even if the claim was 
otherwise unquestionably a winning one. If the evidence is 
just over a preponderance, the plaintiff wins full damages; 
just under, the plaintiff gets nothing. In bankruptcy law a 
Chapter 7 trustee cannot contest the validity of a debtor's 
claimed exemption when the 30-day period for objecting 
has expired and the trustee failed to obtain an extension; 
and this is true even if the debtor has no colorable basis for 
claiming the exemption. Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 
U.S. 638, 112 S.Ct. 1644 (1992). To take an example closer 
to our case, we have read the word "only" in the 
antimodification clause's phrase, "secured only by a 
security interest in . . . the debtor's principal residence," to 
mean that the clause's protection is unavailable when the 
loan is secured not just by the debtor's residence but by 
other property as well. See, e.g., Hammond v. 
Commonwealth Mortgage Co., 27 F.3d 52 (3d Cir. 1994); 
Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 
126-29 (3d Cir. 1990). What these examples show is that 
line drawing is often required in the law and, at the 
boundary, the appearance of unfairness is unavoidable. 
Simply pointing out that some arbitrariness occurs is not a 
compelling objection. 
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Master Financial believes that the law should always 
prevent the modification of a mortgage in a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy and hence the law should not require a 
distinction between a wholly unsecured and a partially 
secured mortgage. This is essentially the argument that the 
result is unjust. As we have explained, there is no way to 
reconcile Master Financial's position with the reasoning in 
Justice Thomas's opinion. Even if we agreed with Master 
Financial's argument that the result is unjust, we would be 
bound. But in any event, holders of second mortgages are 
in a sense unintended beneficiaries of congressional intent 
to boost the home-buying and home-building markets. And 
to the extent there is any unfairness in the distinction 
between wholly unsecured mortgage holders and those 
secured only by a nominal value, the creditor with only a 
dollar's worth of security in the property cannot be heard to 
complain--such a creditor can invoke the antimodification 
clause. Any unfairness in that circumstance falls on the 
debtor. The only class of creditors who can complain are 
those who are wholly unsecured, but as we set forth above, 
these creditors are not worse off than other secured 
creditors who operate outside of mortgage lending. 
 
We also note that our holding frequently will not make 
holders of wholly unsecured residential mortgages worse off 
than they would be under Master Financial's own rule 
making a wholly unsecured residential mortgage 
unmodifiable. This is true because a debtor who has 
outstanding balances on multiple mortgages exceeding the 
current value of the debtor's home often will not try to keep 
a home encumbered with so much debt, and instead will 
turn to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and allow the home to be 
sold in liquidation. For example, consider that in our case 
Master Financial's reading of Nobelman would have the 
McDonalds pay, according to the McDonalds' statement of 
the facts, $174,479.75 to keep a home worth $126,400. A 
rational debtor might well decide to switch to Chapter 7, 
lose the home, and start over. Once the debtor proceeds 
under Chapter 7, a holder of a wholly unsecured mortgage 
will again, under S 506(a), be deemed unsecured and 
receive no more (and possibly less) money than that 
creditor would have under our interpretation of the 
antimodification clause. See 11 U.S.C.S 1325 (providing 
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requirements for a Chapter 13 plan's payment of unsecured 
creditors). 
 
We also think it is significant that courts have repeatedly 
emphasized Congress's preference that individual debtors 
use Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7. Part of the reason for 
this preference is that unsecured creditors often receive 
more money under successful Chapter 13 plans than they 
would under a Chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcy. To the 
extent Master Financial's rule would stampede more 
debtors into Chapter 7, Master Financial's strong 
interpretation of the antimodification clause would pursue 
the tenuous gains for holders of wholly unsecured 
mortgages by imposing losses on other unsecured creditors 
who will be worse off in Chapter 7 than they would have 
been in Chapter 13. 
 
Master Financial responds that Chapter 7 will not offer a 
viable alternative for debtors because the Supreme Court 
has rejected lien-stripping in Chapter 7. See Dewsnup v. 
Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 112 S.Ct. 773 (1992). It is true that in 
Dewsnup the Supreme Court concluded that a debtor in 
Chapter 7 could not use S 506(d) to " `strip down' a 
creditor's lien on real property to the value of the collateral, 
as judicially determined, when that value is less than the 
amount of the claim secured by the lien." Id.  at 412, 112 
S.Ct. at 775. The Court reached this conclusion to prevent 
debtors from benefitting from any increase in the value of 
their home between the time its value was judicially 
determined (and hence the time part of the debt was 
deemed unsecured) to the time of the later foreclosure sale. 
For example, before Dewsnup if the outstanding balance on 
the mortgage was $120,000, the house was judicially 
valued at $100,000, and the house's value later rose to 
$130,000 by the foreclosure sale, the debtor could strip 
down the lien to $100,000 and later take the $30,000 
increase free of the creditor's claim to the $20,000. Because 
Dewsnup allowed the creditor in Chapter 7 to maintain a 
claim against the property for the unsecured balance, the 
decision prevented a Chapter 7 debtor from benefitting from 
an increase in the value of the home. But what matters for 
our purposes is that even under Dewsnup the debtor is still 
discharged of personal liability, so Dewsnup does not 
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eliminate the incentive to switch from Chapter 13 to 7 in 
order to escape debt on a home that far exceeds the home's 
value. A debtor in the McDonalds' position would still view 
Chapter 7 as a better alternative than Chapter 13. 
 
It is also worth noting that courts are split on whether 
Dewsnup's rejection of lien-stripping in Chapter 7 applies to 
a wholly unsecured lien, although of course we express no 
view on that dispute. Compare In re Yi, 219 B.R. 394 
(E.D.Va. 1998), and Howard v. National Westminister Bank, 
184 B.R. 644 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1995), with In re Laskin, 222 
B.R. 872 (9th Cir. BAP 1998). 
 
One last point should be mentioned. This appeal does not 
require us to decide what date a court should use to 
determine whether a mortgage is wholly unsecured. The 
parties appear to have assumed that the date the adversary 
proceeding was initiated should be used. There is no clear 
consensus in the caselaw. Compare In re McCarron , 242 
B.R. 479, 482 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 2000)(using the date the 
bankruptcy petition was filed) with In re Crain, 243 B.R. 75 
(Bankr.C.D.Calif. 1999)(using the effective date of the 
Chapter 13 debtor's plan or ten days after the order 
confirming the plan if no timely appeal has been made). 
Section 506(a) states, "Such value shall be determined in 
light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed 
disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with 
any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan 
affecting such creditor's interest." Although we need not 
resolve the issue, we point out that whatever rule is 
adopted, it is desirable to avoid allowing an appeal to delay 
the date used for evaluation. Such a rule could encourage 
the losing party to bring an appeal in the hope of obtaining 
a more favorable evaluation. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a wholly 
unsecured mortgage is not subject to the antimodification 
clause in S 1322(b)(2). The judgment of the District Court 
will be reversed. The case will be remanded to the District 
Court for it to remand the matter to the Bankruptcy Court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs 
taxed against appellee. 
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